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Abstract
The global economy produces energy from two sources: a polluting non-
renewable resource and a renewable resource. Transforming crude energy
into ready-to-use energy services requires costly processes and more efficient
energy transformation rates are more costly to achieve. Renewable energy
is in competition with food production for land acreage but the food pro-
ductivity rate of land can also be improved at some cost. The exploitation
of non-renewable energy releases polluting emissions in the atmosphere. To
avoid catastrophic climate damages, the pollution stock is mandated to stay
below a given cap. In the interesting case where the economy would be
constrained by the carbon cap at least temporarily, we show the following.
When the economy is not constrained by the cap, the efficiency rates of en-
ergy transformation increase steadily until the transition toward the ultimate
green economy; when renewable energy is exploited, its land acreage rises at
the expense of food production; food productivity increases together with
the land rent but food production drops; the prices of useful energy and food
increase and renewables substitute for non-renewable energy. During the
constrained phase, the economy follows a constant path of prices, quantities,
efficiency rates, food productivity and land rent, a phenomenon we call the
generalized ceiling paradox.
Keywords: energy efficiency; carbon pollution; non-renewable resources;
renewable resources; land use.
JEL classifications: Q00, Q32, Q43, Q54.
1 Introduction
Meeting the ambitious objectives of the COP 21 recent agreement will require
huge changes of the present energy systems throughout the next decades.
The transition toward a ’green’ economy depends on both significant energy
efficiency improvements and a progressive substitution from polluting fossil
fuels to carbon free renewable energy sources. Furthermore, energy transition
is both a scale problem: in which proportion different ’greening’ options
should be combined, and a time problem: what should be their ordering
throughout time.
Many constraints affect the transition toward a green economy. First are
time to build issues: replacing fossil fuels by renewables like wind or solar
energy implies the accumulation of dedicated capital goods. Second the tran-
sition may require significant technological improvements and innovations in
energy production, storage and delivery systems.1 Third renewable energy
sources may be competing for inputs with other production systems. This is
especially the case for land with respect to food production.
The objectives of this paper are two-fold. First we want to stress the
importance of energy efficiency dynamics during the transition from a fossil-
fuel based economy toward a carbon-free renewable economy. The improve-
ment of the conversion rates of fossil fuel energy into energy services is a
way to reduce the carbon content of final output. Fossil fuels are relatively
cheap and abundant today. Satisfying the energy needs while polluting less
thanks to more efficient transformation processes of fossil energy into ready-
to-use energy stands as an appealing option in that respect. Renewables can
also benefit from parallel enhancements in energy efficiency. While technical
progress is usually offered as the main road to reduce the cost gap between
renewable energy and fossil energy, more efficient devices are generally more
costly to operate, raising the issue of the relative competitiveness dynamics
of renewables with respect to fossils.
If the substitution option has received considerable attention in the eco-
1Recent studies of capital building constraints and time to build issues are Amigues,
Ayong and Moreaux (2015), Kollenbach (2015), Gronwald, Long and Röpke (2013). The
literature on the role of technical progress in the energy transition is immense. For a recent
contribution, see Acemoglu et al. (2015).
nomic literature on climate change management, this is much less true for
energy efficiency dynamics. Most models assume given and fixed efficiency
rates for different energy sources or introduce exogenous trends of efficiency
improvements.2
Second we want to examine in some detail the problem of competition
for land between renewable energy and food production. This issue has
raised a significant attention in the preceding decade when the bio-fuel US
regulation has been charged of inducing price hikes on the corn market, the
so-called ’tortilla problem’. It is today recognized that the main cause of
the food price increase during this period was more the dramatic changes
experienced by the world agricultural production system facing high food
demand from emerging countries. However the current population prospects
coupled with the need to expand considerably the use of land for renewable
energy production raises the issue of possible shortcomings in food provision
because of the world arable land scarcity, a problem itself exacerbated by the
potential harmful consequences of climate change on crop yields.
A vast empirical literature has explored the land competition issue be-
tween food and energy provision recently, mostly through large scale sim-
ulation models (Hertel et al., 2010, Rosegrant et al., 2008, Chakravorty et
al., 2014). The theoretical contributions are more rare. The present work
extends the original study of Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux (2008) which
assumed fixed and exogenous efficiency rates instead of endogenous rates as
in the present paper.
We consider an economy producing ready-to-use energy from two crude
energy sources. The first one is a non-renewable and polluting fossil fuel,
the second one is renewable and carbon free but requires some land acreage,
one can think to bio-fuels production, solar farms or wind turbines as typ-
ical examples. The transformation of crude energy into useful energy from
any source is a costly process and higher conversion rates are more costly
to achieve. Burning fossil fuels to produce useful energy releases polluting
2On the theoretical side, main original contributions are Tahvonen (1991), Tahvonen
and Kuuluvainen (1991), Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), Withagen (1994), Tahvonen and
Withagen (1996), Toman and Withagen (2000). For more recent contributions see Golosov
et al. (2014), Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014). The applied literature has intensively
used IAM’s to assess climate policy options. Prominent contributions are Gerlagh, Van
der Zwaan (2006), Stern (2007), Nordhaus (2008).
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emissions in the atmosphere. To prevent excessive climate damages, the
atmospheric carbon concentration must be maintained below some cap, or
ceiling, as in Chakravorty, Magné, Moreaux (2006).
Land may be used either to produce renewable energy or food. The ef-
ficiency rate of energy transformation from the renewable source may be
improved over time, meaning an increased land productivity for energy pro-
duction. The same applies to food production, farmers being able to rise
food land productivity but higher agricultural performances are also more
costly.
In the interesting situation where fossil fuels would be so abundant that
the economy is eventually constrained by the atmospheric carbon cap, we
ask the following questions. What should be the optimal substitution path
from fossil fuels to renewable energy? What are the dynamics of the energy
efficiency rates? How should evolve the land allocation to food and energy
production respectively? What should be the trends of food productivity
and the land rent? How the prices of useful energy and food should evolve,
together with the shadow cost of carbon pollution, equivalently the ’social
cost’ of carbon?
To answer these questions we develop a highly stylized model able to
catch the main ingredients of the inter-temporal arbitrage problems faced by
the society, between producing energy from fossil resources or renewables,
between producing food or renewable energy. Our main findings are the fol-
lowing. The energy transition is a sequence of three time phases. During
a first phase, the economy accumulates carbon until its faces the cap con-
straint. Then the cap binds, implying a constant rate of fossil fuel extraction.
The fossil resource being exhaustible, there must exist some time when even
without a carbon constraint, the economy would choose to extract fossil re-
sources at a lower rate than what is mandated by the cap. Thus the economy
escapes from the cap and enters an unconstrained phase until the end of fossil
fuel exploitation. Last begins the ultimate green economic regime when the
society produces only renewable energy and food.
During the unconstrained phases, the useful energy price rises together
with the efficiency rate of fossil energy production. When renewable energy
is produced jointly with non-renewable energy, its efficiency rate rises also
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and it takes an increasing share in the energy mix. Furthermore the land
acreage devoted to renewable energy expands at the expense of the land
acreage for food production and the land rent increases. The food sector
reacts to this trend by increasing its productivity, although insufficiently to
prevent the decline of the food production rate and thus the rise of the food
price. Before the constrained phase, the shadow cost of carbon rises while it
is nil after the constrained phase.
During the constrained phase, the exploitation rate of fossil fuels must
stay constant. This induces a constant price of useful energy and constant
efficiency rates. Implied by this constancy, the land sharing between renew-
able energy production and food production remains constant, together with
the land rent level. The food production sector then maintains constant its
productivity resulting in a constant level of the food production rate and the
food price. We call this phenomenon the ’generalized ceiling paradox’. This
is during the period when the economy faces actually the climate constraint
that it should stop improving its energy performance, stabilizing in turn the
food delivery conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 2 presents the model.
In section 3 we lay down the optimality problem faced by the society and
characterize the main features of the variables dynamics. The optimal paths
are described in Section 4. The last Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model extends Amigues and Moreaux (2015-a) to incorporate land com-
petition dynamics between food and energy production. We consider a sta-
tionary economy producing both food and energy services.3 Food production
requires both land and other inputs. Energy services can be produced from
either the exploitation of a polluting non-renewable resource (oil) or the ex-
3From a pure energy perspective food is an energy service, a vital one. However ac-
cording to the Guide Michelin other characteristics than the pure energy content of food
should be taken into account. We neglect the qualitative characteristics of food given the
problem at stake.
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ploitation of land (solar) both with other inputs.4
2.1 Food and energy needs and gross surplus
Let us denote respectively by qe and qf the instantaneous consumption rates
of energy and food. To simplify we first assume that the gross surplus gener-
ated by any pair of instantaneous consumption rates, u(qe, qf ), is additively
separable and may be written as u(qe, qf ) = ue(qe) + uf (qf ), each function
ui, i = e, f , satisfying the standard following assumption A.1.
Assumption A. 1 For any i = e, f , ui : R+ → R is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing, u′i ≡ dui/dqi > 0, strictly concave, u′′i (qi) ≡
d2ui/dq
2
i < 0, and satisfies the basic Inada condition: limqi↓0 u′i(qi) = +∞.
Assumption A.1 is not innocuous, asserting that a smaller food diet may
be compensated by a larger energy consumption. The other extreme assump-
tion would be to assume that energy services and food are strictly comple-
mentary goods.
We denote alternatively by pi(qi) the marginal gross surplus function or
inverse demand function, pi(qi) ≡ u′i(qi), and by qdi (pi) its inverse, the direct
demand function.
2.2 The oil energy sector
The oil energy sector includes two industries: The extraction or mining in-
dustry produces extracted oil from the underground resource and the trans-
formation industry produces energy services from extracted oil.
The extractive industry
4We subsume as ’solar energy’, different renewable energy sources requiring space
and/or sun energy like solar PVs, wind energy or biofuels.
5
LetX(t) denote the underground stock of oil at time tmeasured in energy
units, X0 the initial endowment, X(0) = X0, and x(t) the instantaneous
extraction rate or extracted oil production: X˙(t) = −x(t). The unitary
extraction cost depends on the grade under exploitation, as in Heal (1976)
and Hanson (1980). Let a(X) denote this unitary cost. The function a(.)
satisfies the following standard assumption.5
Assumption A. 2 a : (0, X0] → R+ is twice continuously differentiable
on (0, X0), strictly decreasing, a′(X) ≡ da(X)/dX < 0, strictly convex,
a′′(X) ≡ d2a(X)/dX2 > 0, with a(0+) = +∞ and a′(0+) = +∞.
Under a′(0+) = +∞ and the below assumptions on the solar energy costs,
some part of the oil endowment is left underground.
The oil transformation industry
Let us denote by ηx the fraction of extracted oil energy which is converted
into useful energy by the oil transformation industry, what we call also the
efficiency rate of the industry. Converting a higher fraction of extracted oil
requires more sophisticated processes, that is more costly ones. Let b(ηx) be
the unitary processing cost of the extracted oil input necessary to achieve
the efficiency rate ηx, equal to the marginal cost. Processing x units of oil
with the efficiency rate ηx allows to obtain qx = ηxx units of useful energy
at the processing cost b(ηx)x. Hence the average production cost of useful
oil energy amounts to b(ηx)/ηx, also equal to the marginal cost. We assume
that b(ηx)/ηx is increasing, hence also b′(ηx) ≡ db(ηx)/dηx.6
Assumption A. 3 b : [0, 1) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, 1), strictly increasing, b′(ηx) > 0, strictly convex, b′′(ηx) ≡ d2b(ηx)/dη2x >
5For any function f(x) defined on X ⊆ R, and for any value x¯ ∈ X, we denote by f(x¯−)
and f(x¯+) respectively, the limits limx↑x¯ f(x) and limx↓x¯ f(x) when such limits exist.
6Differentiating the average production cost b(ηx)/ηx yields:
d
dηx
b(ηx)
ηx
=
1
ηx
[
b′(ηx)− b(ηx)
ηx
]
.
Hence b′(ηx) > 0 is necessary for d (b(ηx)/ηx) /dηx > 0.
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0, with b(0+) = 0, b′(0+) > 0, b(1−) = +∞ and b′(1−) = +∞. The average
production cost of useful oil energy, and so the marginal cost, is a strictly
increasing function of ηx: b′(ηx) > b(ηx)/ηx and limηx↓0 b(ηx)/ηx > 0.7
Producing useful energy from oil requires other costly inputs, hence a
strictly positive marginal cost at 0+: limηx↓0 b(ηx)/ηx > 0. The assumptions
b(1−) = +∞ and b′(1−) = +∞ mean that a complete conversion of the
energy content of the extracted oil is not physically possible.
Carbon pollution
Burning oil to produce useful energy generates in the atmosphere a pol-
lution flow proportional to the flow of the extracted oil input used in the
transformation industry. Let ζ be the unitary pollution content of oil, hence
a pollution flow ζx(t) at time t, feeding the atmospheric pollution stock. De-
note by Z(t) the size of this pollution stock at time t and by Z0 the stock
inherited from the past, Z(0) = Z0. The pollution stock self-regenerates at
a proportional rate α, assumed constant to simplify. Hence the dynamics of
Z(t) is given by Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αZ(t).
The atmospheric pollution concentration is constrained to be kept at
most equal to some cap, or ceiling, Z¯, as in Chakravorty, Magné and More-
aux (2006), to prevent excessive climate damages. As far as the average earth
temperature level is an increasing function of the atmospheric carbon con-
centration, such a cap may be seen as another formulation of the +20 target
assuming that +20 is an effective constraint and not a mere wish. In order
that the model makes sense we must assume that Z0 < Z¯. When the ceiling
constraint binds, then there is a cap on the oil input in the transformation
industry that we denote by x¯: x¯ = αZ¯/ζ.
2.3 The solar energy sector
The solar energy sector uses some part Le of the available land L¯ to pro-
duce useful energy. Are included in this sector all the activities required to
7Note that b′(ηx) > b(ηx)/ηx, ηx ∈ (0, 1), implies that b′(0+) ≥ limηx↓0 b(ηx)/ηx, hence
b′(0+) > 0.
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bring ready-to-use energy to the final users. Thus it may include agricultural
activities when, for example, ethanol is produced from sugar cane, together
with all the industrial processes necessary to transform the sugar cane into
ethanol.
The available land is assumed to be homogeneous and to receive ym units
of solar energy by acreage unit. The problem of the solar energy sector is to
convert ym into useful energy. Let ηy be the conversion or efficiency rate, so
that the useful energy produced by the solar sector, denoted by qy, amounts
to ηyymLe.
Choosing higher conversion rates implies to bring into operation more
elaborate techniques, that is more costly ones, like in the extracted oil trans-
formation industry. Let us denote by h(ηy) the average conversion cost per
unit of natural energy required to work with an efficiency rate ηy. Since a
cost h(ηy)ym allows to produce ηyym units of useful energy then the unitary
cost of useful energy is equal to h(ηy)/ηy. We assume that this unitary cost
is increasing, implying that h(ηy) itself is also increasing.
Assumption A. 4 h : [0, 1) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, 1), strictly increasing, h′(ηy) ≡ dh/dηy > 0, strictly convex, h′′(ηy) ≡
d2h/dη2y > 0, with h(0) = 0 and h′(0+) > 0, and h(1−) = +∞ and h′(1−) =
+∞. The average cost of useful energy and so the marginal cost is a strictly
increasing function of ηy: h′(ηy) > h(ηy)/ηy, and limηy↓0 h(ηy)/ηy > 0.
The rationale for A.4 is the same than the rationale for A.3.
2.4 The food sector
The food sector includes not only the agricultural activities but also all the
industrial activities necessary to bring ready-to-eat food to the consumers.
Let Lf be the acreage of land devoted to the production of food and denote
by ϕ the average production of food per unit of land so that the total food
production amounts to ϕLf . Let f(ϕ) be the average production cost per
unit of land hence an average cost f(ϕ)/ϕ per unit of food. Clearly the
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land productivity is bounded from above. Let ϕu be this upper bound.
The following assumption A.5 is for the production of food, similar to the
assumptions A.3 and A.4 for the production of useful energy.
Assumption A. 5 f : [0, ϕu) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, ϕu), strictly increasing, f ′(ϕ) ≡ df/dϕ > 0, strictly convex, f ′′(ϕ) ≡
d2f/dϕ2 > 0, with f(0) = 0 and f ′(0+) > 0, and f(ϕ−u ) = +∞ and f ′(ϕ−) =
+∞. The average cost of food and so the marginal cost is a strictly increasing
function of ϕ: f ′(ϕ) > f(ϕ)/ϕ, and limϕ↓0 f(ϕ)/ϕ > 0.
We assume that the allocation of land to the production of energy and to
the production of food may be adjusted instantaneously and costlessly.
2.5 The optimal land use and the land rent
A strong implication of the assumption A.5 is the following proposition.
Proposition P. 1 Under the assumptions A.1 and A.5, the land rent is
always positive, the land is scarce: Le + Lf = L¯.
Proof : Let L∗e, L∗e ∈ [0, L¯), be the optimal acreage of land devoted to
energy production, then the optimal management of the food sector is this
pair (ϕ,Lf ) solving the following food sector problem (F.S.P ):8
(F.S.P ) maxϕ,Lf uf (ϕLf )− f(ϕ)Lf
s.t. L¯− L∗e − Lf ≥ 0 .
Denote by λL the multiplier associated to the land availability constraint and
by Lf the Lagrangian:
Lf = uf (ϕLf )− f(ϕ)Lf + λL
[
L¯− L∗e − Lf
]
.
8We neglect the non-negativity constraints on ϕ, Lf and the upper bound constraint
of ϕ, all of which are satisfied.
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The f.o.c’s are:
∂Lf
∂ϕ
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf ) = f ′(ϕ) , (2.1)
∂Lf
∂Lf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf )ϕ = f(ϕ) + λL , (2.2)
together with the complementary slackness condition:
λL ≥ 0 , L¯− L∗e − Lf ≥ 0 and λL
[
L¯− L∗e − Lf
]
= 0 . (2.3)
Let (ϕ∗, L∗f , λ∗L) be a solution of the system (2.1)-(2.3) such that λ∗L = 0
so that (2.2) may be simplified to get u′f
(
ϕ∗L∗f
)
= f(ϕ∗)/ϕ∗, hence by (2.1):
f ′(ϕ∗) = f(ϕ∗)/ϕ∗. However according to A.5: f ′ϕ) > f(ϕ)/ϕ for all ϕ ∈
(0, ϕu), hence for ϕ∗, a contradiction.
The intuition behind this result is quite clear. Assumption A.5 means
that more extensive agricultures are less costly than more intensive ones.
Assume that a quantity of food qf is produced thank to an acreage Lf and
a productivity ϕ: qf = ϕLf . Assume also that the land constraint is slack:
L∗e + Lf < L¯. Then the same quantity of food can be produced on a larger
acreage L′f > Lf , L¯ − L∗e − L′f ≥ 0, with a lower productivity ϕ′ < ϕ:
qf = ϕ
′L′f . Since a more extensive land exploitation is less costly, the total
cost of qf is smaller with (ϕ′, L′f ) than with (ϕ,Lf ) and (ϕ,Lf ) cannot be
optimal.
The other assumption having strong implications on the agricultural sec-
tor is the additive separability of the gross surplus function.
Proposition P. 2 Under the assumption of additive separability of the gross
surplus function and the assumption A.5, the productivity in the food sector
and the food production rate are both constant when the land acreage devoted
to the energy production is constant.
Proof : If Le(t) is constant during some time interval then the constraint
and the objective function of the problem (F.S.P.) are the same at any time
of the interval hence also its solution.
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Without the separability assumption, it must be pointed out that the
objective function of the problem (F.S.P ) would have to be written as :
u (qe(t), qf (t)) − f (ϕ(t))Lf (t), to be maximized under the constraints L¯ −
Le − Lf (t) ≥ 0 and ϕ(t)Lf (t) − qf (t) ≥ 0, where Le is the constant acreage
allocated to energy production. The f.o.c’s would be now:
∂u (qe(t), qf (t))
∂qf (t)
= f ′(ϕ(t)) (2.4)
∂u (qe(t), qf (t))
∂qf (t)
ϕ(t) = f(ϕ(t)) + λL(t) . (2.5)
Without the separability assumption, ∂2u/∂qe∂qf 6= 0, hence (2.4) and (2.5)
cannot be reduced to (2.1) and (2.2). With Le held constant, but not qe(t),
Lf would be constant because Proposition 1 still holds, but the productivity
in the food sector would be no more constant.
Another implication of Proposition 2 is that, when the energy needs are
fed only by oil, the food consumption rate, the food price level and the land
rent should be constant for two reasons. On the one hand, Le = 0 implies that
Lf (t) = L¯, a constant, and on the other hand, the food productivity rate, ϕ,
should also be constant under the separability assumption, hence qf = ϕL¯ is
constant together with pf = u′f (qf ) and λL = pfϕ − f(ϕ), independently of
the possible time evolutions of the oil extraction rate, x(t), the useful energy
production rate, qe(t) = qx(t), and the energy price, pe(t).
2.6 The ultimate green economy
Let t¯x be the time at which ends the oil exploitation, that is the time at
which ends the transition toward the green renewable economy. Whatever
the pollution stock level at this time, either Z¯ or a lower level, from t¯x onwards
the pollution stock constraint can be put aside since Z(t) is now decreasing:
Z(t) = Z(t¯x)e
−α(t−t¯x), t ≥ t¯x. Since the land allocation is freely adjustable,
once at t¯x the best at each future time is to choose the transformation rate η˜y,
the productivity level ϕ˜ and the land allocation (L˜e, L˜f ) solving the following
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static green economy problem (G.E.P ):9
(G.E.P ) max
ηy ,ϕ,Le,Lf
ue(ηyy
mLe) + uf (ϕLf )− h(ηy)ymLe − f(ϕ)Lf
s.t. L¯− Le − Lf ≥ 0 .
Keeping the notation λL for the multiplier associated to the land availability
constraint, the Lagrangian of the problem, denoted by Lg, reads:
Lg = ue(ηyymLe) + uf (ϕLf )− h(ηy)ymLe − f(ϕ)Lf + λL(L¯− Le − Lf ) ,
and the f.o.c’s are, after elementary simplifications:
∂Lg
∂ηy
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηyymLe) = h′(ηy) (2.6)
∂Lg
∂Le
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηyymLe)ηyym = h(ηy)ym + λL (2.7)
∂Lg
∂ϕ
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf ) = f ′(ϕ) (2.8)
∂Lg
∂Lf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf )ϕ = f(ϕ) + λL , (2.9)
together with the complementary slackness condition:
λL ≥ 0 , L¯− Le − Lf ≥ 0 and λL
[
L¯− Le − Lf
]
= 0 . (2.10)
Taking η˜e and L˜e as given, the problem (G.E.P ) is nothing but than
the problem (F.S.P ) and the conditions (2.8)-(2.10) are the conditions (2.1)-
(2.3). Now λL appears in both (2.7) for the energy sector and (2.9) for
the food sector, mirroring their competition for the land attribution. By
Proposition 1 the optimal value of the land rent λ˜L is positive and the land
availability constraint is tight. Denote by λfL(Le) the implicit relationship be-
tween the optimized value of the land rent in the problem (F.S.P.) and the
land acreage devoted to solar energy production, Le. Substituting λfL(Le) for
λL in (2.7) expresses (2.6)-(2.7) as a system in two unknowns, ηy and Le. Un-
der our assumptions, this system admits a unique solution, the optimal value
of L˜e allowing in turn to determine the unique triplet (ϕ˜, L˜f , λ˜L) solution of
(2.8)-(2.10). Thus the problem (G.E.P ) admits a unique solution.
9We omit the constraints 0 ≤ ηy ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕu, 0 ≤ Le and 0 ≤ Lf which are
satisfied as strict inequalities under the assumptions A.1, A.4 and A5.
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In what follows, we denote by W˜ the capitalized value of the green econ-
omy, measured in current value at the time t¯x at which it begins:
W˜ =
∫ ∞
t¯x
{
ue(η˜yy
mL˜e) + uf (ϕ˜L˜f )− h(η˜y)ymL˜e − f(ϕ˜)L˜f
}
e−ρ(t−t¯x)dt
=
1
ρ
{
ue(η˜yy
mL˜e) + uf (ϕ˜L˜f )− h(η˜y)ymL˜e − f(ϕ˜)L˜f
}
. (2.11)
3 The social planner problem
3.1 The problem
The social planner determines the duration of the transition t¯x and the paths
of oil extraction, x(t), of the transformation rates ηx(t) and ηy(t), of the pro-
ductivity of land for food production, ϕ(t), and of the land allocation, Le(t)
and Lf (t), during the transition toward the green economy, t ∈ [0, t¯x), which
maximize the social welfare. She/he solves the following problem (S.P.1):10
10We omit the constraints 0 ≤ X(t), ηx(t) < 1, ηy(t) < 1, 0 ≤ ϕ(t) < ϕu and 0 ≤ Lf (t)
which are all satisfied as strict inequalities under the assumptions A.1 to A.5. Note also
that under instantaneously and costlessly adjustable land allocation, the land allocation
at time t = 0 is endogenously determined and not inherited from the past, contrary to the
oil stock and the pollution stock.
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(S.P.1)
max
{x(t), ηx(t), ηy(t)
ϕ(t), Le(t), Lf (t)}t¯x0
and t¯x
s.t.
∫ t¯x
0
{ue (ηx(t)x(t) + ηy(t)ymLe(t)) + uf (ϕ(t)Lf (t))
−a(X(t))x(t)− b(ηx(t))x(t)
−h(ηy(t))ymLe(t)− f(ϕ(t))Lf (t)} e−ρtdt
+W˜e−ρt¯x
X˙(t) = −x(t) , X(0) = X0 given
L¯− Le(t)− Lf (t) ≥ 0 , Lf (t) ≥ 0 , Le(t) ≥ 0
Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αZ(t) , Z(0) = Z0 < Z¯ given
and Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0
x(t) ≥ 0 , ηx(t) ≥ 0 and ηy(t) ≥ 0 .
The social planner problem may be alternatively written as a problem in
which the upper bound of the integral of the objective function is extended
up to infinity and the second term of the objective function is deleted. Then
t¯x formally disappears from the set of arguments with respect to which the
optimization is performed. In this alternative formulation, that we call prob-
lem (S.P.2), the constraints are the same.
Let λX and −λZ be the co-state variables associated to X and Z respec-
tively.11 The current value Hamiltonian of the problems (S.P.1) and (S.P.2),
denoted by H, reads:12
H = ue (ηxx+ ηyymLe) + uf (ϕLf )− a(X)x
−b(ηx)x− h(ηy)ymLe − f(ϕ)Lf − λXx− λZ [ζx− αZ] .
Denote by λL the Lagrange multiplier associated to the land availability con-
straint, by νe the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint on
11By choosing −λZ as the co-state variable of Z, we may interpret λZ as the shadow
marginal cost of the pollution stock.
12We omit the time index when this causes no confusion.
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the land acreage devoted to energy production, by νZ the multiplier asso-
ciated to the cap constraint on the pollution stock and by γx, γηx, and γηy
the multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints on x, ηx and ηy
respectively. Let L be the current value Lagrangian of the problem:
L = H + λL[L¯− Le − Lf ] + νeLe + νZ [Z¯ − Z]
+γxx+ γηxηx + γηyηy .
For both (S.P.1) and (S.P.2) the f.o.c’s are:
∂L
∂x
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLe)ηx = a(X) + λX + b(ηx)
+ζλZ − γx (3.1)
∂L
∂ηx
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLe)x = b′(ηx)x− γηx (3.2)
∂L
∂Le
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLe)ηyym = h(ηy)ym + λL − νe (3.3)
∂L
∂ηy
= 0 =⇒ u′e(ηxx+ ηyymLe)ymLe = h′(ηy)ymLe − γηy (3.4)
∂L
∂Lf
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf )ϕ = f(ϕ) + λL (3.5)
∂L
∂ϕ
= 0 =⇒ u′f (ϕLf ) = f ′(ϕ) , (3.6)
together with the usual complementary slackness conditions.
The dynamics of the co-state variables must satisfy if time differentiable:
λ˙X = ρλX − ∂L
∂X
=⇒ λ˙X(t) = ρλX(t) + a′ (X(t))x(t) (3.7)
λ˙Z = ρλZ +
∂L
∂Z
=⇒ λ˙Z(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t)− νZ(t) (3.8)
νZ(t) ≥ 0, Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 and νZ(t)
[
Z¯ − Z(t)] = 0 . (3.9)
Last, for the problem (S.P.1) we must have at the end of the transition:
H(t¯−x ) ≡ H
(
x(t¯−x ), ηx(t¯
−
x ), ηy(t¯
−
x ), ϕ(t¯
−
x ), Le(t¯
−
x ), Lf (t¯
−
x ), λX(t¯
−
x ), λZ(t¯
−
x )
)
= ρW˜
= ue(η˜yy
mL˜e) + uf (ϕ˜L˜f )− h(η˜y)ymL˜e − f(ϕ˜)L˜f . (3.10)
For the problem (S.P.2), the transversality condition at infinity is:
lim
t↑∞
[λX(t)X(t) + λZ(t)Z(t)] e
−ρt = 0 . (3.11)
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Mining rent and full marginal cost of oil exploitation
According to (3.7) the path of the mining rent is not necessarily monotonous
since a′(X) < 0. However, the full marginal cost of the extracted oil, that is
the marginal cost augmented by the mining rent, is increasing. Let us denote
by µ(t) this full marginal cost: µ(t) = a(X(t)) + λX(t). Time differentiating
and substituting (3.7) for λ˙X yields:
µ˙(t) = −a′(X(t))x(t) + ρλX(t) + a′(X(t))x(t) = ρλX(t) > 0 .
(3.12)
Along the optimal path, the behavior of the marginal cost of extracted coal
is dominated by the increase of its marginal extraction cost component:
sign µ˙(t) = sign a˙(X(t)) = −sign a′(X(t))x(t) > 0.
Land use and land rent
The land allocation is determined by the sub-system (3.3)-(3.6). The
link between the two alternatives uses of the land is given by the land rent,
λL, which appears in (3.3) for the energy production and in (3.5) for the
food production. The link between the land allocation problem and the
competitiveness of the oil sector is given by the price of the useful energy,
pe = u
′
e, which appears in (3.3) and (3.4) for the solar energy sector and in
(3.1) and (3.2) for the oil sector.
In order that the land be divided between energy and food production
the marginal net surplus must be the same in both production sectors, that
is (c.f. (3.3) and (3.5)):
(peηy − h(ηy)) ym = λL = pfϕ− f(ϕ) , (3.13)
where ηy and ϕ are optimally determined, that is solve respectively (3.4):
pe = h
′(ηy), and (3.6): pf = f ′(ϕ). The l.h.s. of the equality (3.13) is the
marginal net surplus generated by the allocation of an additional unit of land
to the energy production and the r.h.s. is the marginal net surplus generated
by its allocation to the food production.
There exist two benchmark prices of the useful energy. The first one, we
denote by ph
e
, is the price under which the transformation cost of natural solar
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energy into useful energy cannot be recovered. Since the average transforma-
tion cost h(ηy)/ηy is an increasing function of ηy, then phe = limηy↓0 h(ηy)/ηy.
This benchmark depends upon the inner cost structure of the solar energy
production.
That pe be higher than phe does not justify by itself solar energy produc-
tion. For pe > phe the l.h.s. of (3.13) is positive but not necessarily matching
λL, and another problem is: which λL to match? When the solar energy
production is nil, then Lf = L¯ as shown in Section 2. Then the productivity
in the food sector is this level ϕ of ϕ which solves (3.6) (equivalently (2.1))
with Lf = L¯: u′f (ϕL¯) = f ′(ϕ). Then the food price is pf = u
′
f (ϕL¯) and the
land rent amounts to λL = pfϕ− f(ϕ), which is the level of the land rent to
be matched. We define the benchmark pf
e
as the level of the useful energy
price for which:(
peϕ− h(ηy)
)
ym = λL and ηy solves (3.3) : pe = h′(ηy) .
For energy prices pe > pfe some acreage must be allocated to energy produc-
tion and (3.13) holds.
Shadow marginal cost of pollution
Let us denote by tZ and t¯Z the times at which respectively begins and ends
the period during which the constraint is tight, assuming that the constraint
actually binds along the optimal path. Since initially the pollution stock
is smaller than the cap, Z0 < Z¯, there must exist some pre-ceiling period
[0, tZ), 0 < tZ , during which the constraint does not bind, hence νZ(t) = 0,
t < tZ , and λ˙Z = (ρ+ α)λZ , so that:
λZ(t) = λ
0
Ze
(ρ+α)t , t ∈ [0, tZ) , λ0Z ≡ λZ(0) . (3.14)
After t¯Z , since the constraint will be never anymore active, then:
λZ(t) = 0 , t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞) . (3.15)
It remains to determine the path of λZ(t) when the ceiling constraint
binds. We show in the Subsection 3.3 that λZ(t) decreases during the period
at the ceiling so that λZ(t) is single-peaked and the peak occurs at the precise
time at which the constraint becomes binding.
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Necessity of a post-ceiling period preceding the ultimate green period
Given that the problem (S.P.1) and (S.P.2) are convex problems, then
the shadow prices pe = u′e, pf = u′f and the land rent, λL, all three for any
t ≥ 0, and the mining rent, λX , for t ∈ [0, t¯x), are continuous functions of
time, although maybe not differentiable. These continuity properties imply
that the economy cannot switch directly from the period at the ceiling to the
ultimate green state characterized in the Sub-section 2.6 supra.
Proposition P. 3 Assume that along the optimal path, there exists a time
period at the ceiling, [tZ , t¯Z ], tZ < t¯Z, then there must also exist a post-ceiling
period (t¯Z , t¯x), t¯Z < t¯x, during which oil is exploited before the ultimate green
period [t¯x,∞).
Proof: Assume that such a period does not exist: t¯Z = t¯x ≡ t¯. Since
the optimal path of the shadow price pe must be time continuous at t¯, then
u′e (ηx(t¯
−))x¯+ ηy(t¯−)ymLe(t¯−)) = u′e(η˜yy
mL˜e), hence η˜yL˜e − ηy(t¯−)Le(t¯−) =
ηx(t¯
−)x¯/ym > 0, so that either L˜e − Le(t¯−) > 0, or η˜y − ηy(t¯−) > 0, or both,
the case L˜e − Le(t¯−) < 0 together with η˜y − ηy(t¯−) < 0 being excluded.
Assume first that L˜e − Le(t¯−) > 0, equivalently that Lf (t¯−) > L˜f . Then
from (3.6): ϕ(t¯−) < ϕ˜ and f ′(ϕ˜) > f ′(ϕ(t¯−)) as illustrated in Figure 1, so
that u′f would jump upward at t = t¯, contradicting the time continuity of
the optimal path of pf .
Assume now that η˜y−ηy(t¯−) > 0 and L˜e−Le(t¯−) > 0. Thus Lf (t¯−) > L˜f .
Hence from (3.6), ϕ(t¯−) > ϕ˜ and f ′(ϕ˜) < f ′(ϕ(t¯−)) so that u′f would jump
downwards, contradicting once again the time continuity of pf .
Figure 1 about here
To characterize the dynamics of the different variables during the transi-
tion, it is useful to distinguish the periods of unconstrained oil exploitation
from the period of constrained oil exploitation. The reason is that during
the unconstrained periods, the path of the shadow cost of pollution is well
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characterized (c.f. (3.14) and (3.15) ) while during the constrained period,
it has to be determined, however in this later case, the oil extraction rate is
known, x(t) = x¯.
3.2 Periods of unconstrained oil exploitation
Let us first determine what happens whether oil is the only exploited resource
or both oil and solar are simultaneously exploited, oil exploitation being not
constrained by the cap on the pollution stock.
Let us start from the f.o.c’s (3.1) and (3.2) written as follows:
u′e(qe)ηx = µ+ b(ηx) + ζλZ (3.16)
u′e(qe) = b
′(ηx) . (3.17)
Consider first the unconstrained period preceding the ceiling period, when
λZ > 0.
Time differentiating (3.16), using (3.12), (3.14) and (3.17), we obtain:
q˙e(t) =
ρλX(t) + ζ(ρ+ α)λZ(t)
u′′e(qe(t))ηx(t)
< 0 . (3.18)
After the ceiling period, λZ(t) = 0 through (3.15) and still q˙e(t) = ρλX/(u′′eηx) <
0. Time differentiating (3.17) and making use of (3.18) yields:
η˙x(t) =
u′′e(qe(t))
b′′(ηx(t))
q˙e(t) > 0 . (3.19)
Only oil is exploited
In this case: qe = ηxx, hence:
x˙(t) =
1
ηx(t)
(q˙e(t)− η˙x(t)x(t)) < 0 . (3.20)
Both energy resources are exploited
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Since now Le > 0 and ηy > 0, then we may write (3.4) as follows: u′e(qe) =
h′(ηy). Time differentiating and making use of (3.18), we obtain:
η˙y(t) =
u′′e(qe(t))
h′′(ηy(t))
q˙e(t) > 0 . (3.21)
Since Le > 0, then (3.3) may be written as: (u′e(qe)ηy − h(ηy)) ym = λL.
Again time differentiating, then by (3.18) and (3.4), u′e − h′ = 0, we get:
λ˙L(t) = u
′′
e(qe(t))ηy(t)y
mq˙e(t) > 0 . (3.22)
Last, consider the food sub-system (3.5)-(3.6):
u′f (ϕLf )ϕ = f(ϕ) + λL
u′f (ϕLf ) = f
′(ϕ) .
Time differentiating and using (3.6), u′f − f ′ = 0, we can express ϕ˙ and L˙f
as the following functions of λ˙L: u′′fϕLf u′′fϕ2
u′′fLf − f ′′ u′′fϕ
 ϕ˙
L˙f
 =
 λ˙L
0
 .
Hence:
ϕ˙(t) =
1
f ′′(ϕ(t))ϕ(t)
λ˙L(t) > 0 , (3.23)
L˙f (t) = −
u′′f (qf (t))Lf (t)− f ′′(ϕ(t))
u′′f (qf (t))f ′′(ϕ(t))ϕ2(t)
λ˙L(t) < 0 , (3.24)
q˙f (t) =
1
u′′f (qf (t))ϕ(t)
λ˙L(t) < 0 , (3.25)
L˙e(t) > 0 and q˙y(t) = ηy(t)L˙e(t) + η˙y(t)Le(t) > 0 , (3.26)
q˙x(t) = q˙e(t)− q˙y(t) < 0 and x˙(t) = 1
ηx(t)
[q˙x(t)− η˙x(t)x(t)] < 0 .
(3.27)
Taking stock:
Proposition P. 4 Along the optimal path, during the periods of unconstrained
exploitation:
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a. Whether oil is the only exploited resource or both oil and solar energy
are exploited:
a.i. The production of useful energy decreases, hence its price increases;
a.ii. The production of useful oil energy decreases and the transforma-
tion rate of extracted oil into useful energy increases, hence the
production of extracted oil decreases.
b. When both oil and solar energies are exploited:
b.i. The useful solar energy production increases due to both the in-
crease of the land acreage allocated to the production of this energy
and the increase of the transformation rate of solar energy into
useful energy;
b.ii. The land acreage allocated to food production decreases and the
food productivity of land increases but not sufficiently to compen-
sate for the acreage decrease so that the food production decreases
and its price increases;
b.iii. The land rent increases.
3.3 Periods of constrained oil exploitation
During the period, the dynamics of λZ is not yet known because λ˙Z = (ρ +
α)λZ − νZ and νZ > 0 since the constraint Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 is tight. At this
stage, the only qualitative information that we have is that µ˙(t) > 0 (c.f.
(3.12)) and x˙(t) = 0 since x(t) = x¯. To characterize the constrained period,
we express the dynamics of all the other variables as function of µ˙, taking
care that x = x¯. We may have two types of constrained oil exploitation
periods according to solar energy is simultaneously exploited with oil or not.
Exclusive exploitation of oil: qe = qx = ηxx¯.
Let us start from the f.o.c’s (3.1) and (3.2) written now as follows:
u′e(ηxx¯)ηx = µ+ b(ηx) + ζλZ (3.28)
u′e(ηxx¯) = b
′(ηx) . (3.29)
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Time differentiating and using u′e − b′ = 0, we obtain the following system: u′′e x¯ηx −ζ
u′′e x¯− b′′ 0
 η˙x
λ˙Z
 =
 µ˙
0
 .
Hence:
η˙x(t) = 0 and λ˙Z(t) = −1
ζ
µ˙(t) < 0 . (3.30)
Let us denote by η¯x the constant level of the efficiency rate ηx. Then qe is
constant, qe(t) = qx(t) = η¯xx¯, and also the price of useful energy: pe(t) =
p¯e = u
′
e(η¯xx¯).
The increase of the full marginal cost of the extracted oil is exactly bal-
anced by the decrease of the shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock:
µ˙(t) + ζλ˙Z(t) = 0. The full marginal cost of useful energy, the input cost of
the oil transformation industry, is constant and equal to b′(η¯x), itself equal
to p¯e.
Simultaneous exploitation of both oil and solar energies
Making use of Lf = L¯ − Le, we have to determine six variables as a
function of µ˙: η˙x, η˙y, L˙e, λ˙Z , ϕ˙ and λ˙L.
Let us consider the system of the six f.o.c’s obtained after some simplifi-
cations and substitution of L¯− Le for Lf :
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLe) ηx = µ+ b(ηx) + ζλZ (3.31)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLe) = b
′(ηx) (3.32)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLe) = h
′(ηy) (3.33)
u′e (ηxx¯+ ηyy
mLe) ηyy
m = h(ηy)y
m + λL (3.34)
u′f
(
ϕ
[
L¯− Le
])
= f ′(ϕ) (3.35)
u′f
(
ϕ
[
L¯− Le
])
ϕ = f(ϕ) + λL . (3.36)
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Time differentiating results in the following system: M
; −ζ
; 0
; 0
; 0
; 0
; 0


η˙x
η˙y
L˙e
ϕ˙
λ˙L
λ˙Z
 =

µ˙
0
0
0
0
0
 , (3.37)
where M is a 5 × 6 sub-matrix the details of which are given in Appendix
A.1.
Let us denote by ∆ the determinant on the system and by ∆(k,l) the
sub-determinant obtained by deleting the kth line and the lth column. Thus
∆ = ζ∆(1,6). Note that ∆(1,l) = 0, for l = 1, · · · , 5, so that:
η˙x(t) = η˙y(t) = L˙e(t) = ϕ˙(t) = λ˙L(t) = 0 and λ˙Z(t) = −1
ζ
µ˙(t) .
(3.38)
Like in the case of exclusive oil exploitation all the variables of the model
are constant, excepted the shadow marginal cost of pollution and the full
marginal cost of extracted oil, the decrease of the first balancing the increase
of the second. Thus the full marginal cost of the extracted oil input of
the oil transformation industry is constant. Facing a constant output price
and a constant input price the oil transformation industry must stay with a
constant efficiency rate η¯x.
Thus although constrained by the pollution stock upper bound, absent
any abatement option, it is optimal to undertake no additional effort to
improve the efficiency rates ηx, ηy, ϕ, a situation that Amigues and Moreaux
(2015) have called the ceiling paradox in another context.
Proposition P. 5 Generalized ceiling paradox.
Along the optimal path, whether oil is the only exploited energy or both
oil and solar energies are simultaneously exploited, the economy moves along
a stationary trajectory during the period at the ceiling: Efficiency rates, land
productivity, production levels of extracted oil, useful energies and food, and
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the land allocation are all constant. The only changes come from the increase
of the full marginal cost of extracted oil, exactly balanced by the decrease of
the shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock, so that the full marginal cost
of the useful oil energy is constant. The other costs, the marginal cost of the
solar energy when exploited and the marginal cost of food, the prices of the
useful energy and food, and the land rent are all constant.
An immediate implication of the Proposition 5 is the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Along the optimal path the solar energy becomes to be exploited
either before the arrival at the ceiling or after the end of the period at the
ceiling, but never within the period.
4 Optimal paths
All the optimal paths share a common strong qualitative structure deter-
mined by the increasing scarcity of the non-renewable resource and the ceiling
constraint when the constraint is effective during some time period, and the
constraint is tight provided that the oil endowment be sufficiently abundant.
Assuming that it is the case, there exists only one main type of optimal
paths along which the characteristics of the different periods identified in
the Propositions 1 to 5 hold together with the time continuity of the price
paths, a necessary condition for optimality in the present context. The only
possible differences within this main type come from the time, denoted by
ty, at which begins the exploitation of the solar energy either before or after
the period at the ceiling, and when before the ceiling period, possibly at the
beginning time of the planning period, t = 0.
We describe the type of optimal path along which the solar energy is
not immediately exploited but begins to be exploited before the time tZ at
which the pollution stock Z(t) begins to be constrained by the carbon cap,
Z¯. In this scenario, the optimal path is a five periods path. The implicit
price paths of useful energy and food are illustrated in Figure 2, the efficiency
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rates paths in Figure 3 and the land allocation and land use paths in Figure
4.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 about here
Figure 4 about here
First period [0, ty) : Pre-ceiling phase of exclusive exploitation of the oil
energy source.
During this period, the available land L¯ is allocated to the sole production
of food. The food sector productivity is constant, ϕ(t) = ϕ, together with
the food output qf (t) = qf = ϕL¯, the food implicit price pf (t) = pf = uf (qf ),
and the land rent, λL(t) = λL = pfϕ− f(ϕ).
The production of extracted oil, x(t), decreases, the transformation rate
ηx(t) increases and the production of useful energy, qe(t) = qx(t) decreases,
hence the implicit price of useful energy, pe(t) increases. The flow of pollut-
ing emissions, ζx(t), decreases but remains larger than the self-regeneration
flow, αZ(t), so that the pollution stock increases and the shadow cost of the
pollution stock, λZ(t), rises.
In order that such an initial time period exists, it must be the case that
the initial price of useful energy, pe(0), be lower than the benchmark price
pf
e
. The period ends at time ty when the useful energy price attains the
benchmark level.
Second period (ty, tZ) : Pre-ceiling period of simultaneous exploitation of
both oil and solar energy.
The acreage of land, Le(t), allocated to solar energy production expands
continuously and the transformation rate of solar energy, ηy(t), improves.
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Hence the production of solar energy, qy(t), increases. The productivity in
the food sector, ϕ(t), increases, but not sufficiently to balance the decrease of
the acreage, Lf (t), allocated to food production, hence the food production,
qf (t), drops and its price, pf (t), increases.
The useful energy needs are now satisfied by both oil and solar ener-
gies. The solar energy production, qy(t), increases, due to the simultaneous
increase of the land acreage, Le(t), allocated to its production and of its
transformation rate, ηy(t). The oil extraction rate, x(t), decreases and the
oil efficiency rate, ηx(t), increases, but as in the preceding period, not suf-
ficiently to match the drop of the extraction rate so that the production of
oil useful energy, qx(t), decreases. Moreover, the rise of the solar energy pro-
duction rate does not balance the fall of oil energy production, hence the
aggregate useful energy production, qe(t), decreases as during the first time
period and its price increases.
The useful energy needs are less and less fed by oil useful energy, hence a
stronger pressure on land allocation and a progressive rise of the land rent,
λL(t).
Although time decreasing, the emission flow, ζx(t), is still larger than
the regeneration flow, αZ(t), so that the pollution stock, Z(t), increases and
the shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock, λZ(t), rises. The second
period ends when the pollution stock attains the cap level, Z¯, and its shadow
marginal cost attains its maximum.
Third period [tZ , t¯Z ] : Ceiling period.
When constrained by the cap, the economy extracts oil at a constant rate,
x(t) = x¯, the emission flow thus generated, ζx¯, balancing the constant self-
regeneration flow of the maintained constant pollution stock, αZ(t) = αZ¯.
The other variables of the model are also constant, excepted the marginal/
average extraction cost, a(X(t)), the mining rent, λX(t), and the shadow
marginal cost of the pollution stock, λZ(t). The sum a(X(t)) + λX(t), that
is the full marginal cost of oil extraction, µ(t), increases, µ˙(t) = ρλX(t)
according to (3.12), and the shadow cost of pollution decreases by an amount
λ˙Z(t) = −µ˙(t)/ζ, so that the full marginal cost of the extracted oil input in
the oil transformation industry is also constant.
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The constant values of ηx, ηy, Le, Lf , ϕ and λL solve the system (3.32)-
(3.36).13 The period ends at t = t¯Z when λZ(t) has decreased down to 0.
Fourth period (t¯Z , t¯x) : Last period of oil exploitation.
This is another period of unconstrained oil exploitation during which solar
energy is also exploited, like during the second period, excepted that now, the
shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock is nil. Due to the declining rate
of oil exploitation, the polluting emission flow, ζx(t), falls below ζx¯ and the
pollution stock Z(t) remains below the cap level Z¯. Since the atmospheric
carbon concentration constraint is never more active, the shadow marginal
cost of carbon pollution is nil forever.
The qualitative properties of the dynamics of the production rates, prices,
efficiency rates, land allocation and land rent are the same as their qualitative
properties during the second period. Thus after an halt during the ceiling
period, the land acreage devoted to solar energy production rises again at
the expense of food production, while the land rent grows.
The period ends when the useful energy price level attains its second
benchmark level, p˜e, and x(t) has decreased down to 0.14 The grade at
which ends oil exploitation, X˜ ≡ X(t¯x), is given together with the oil trans-
formation rate, ηx(t¯−x ), as the solution of the system (3.1)-(3.2) in which
λX(t¯
−
x ) = 0 because the mining rent on the last exploited grade must be nil,
and λZ(t¯−x ) = 0, that is:
p˜eηx(t¯
−
x ) = a(X˜) + b(ηx(t¯
−
x )) and p˜e = b
′(ηx(t¯−x )) .
Fifth period, [t¯x,∞) : Ultimate green economy.
The last period is the ultimate green economy characterized in the sub-
section 2.6, in which all the variables are constant excepted the pollution
stock which progressively disappears: Z(t) = Z(t¯x)e−α(t−t¯x).
13Note that (3.31) is deleted because λ˙Z = −µ˙(t)/ζ implies that its r.h.s. reduces to
b(ηx) and λZ disappears from the system (3.31)-(3.36). Only five variables have to be
determined and one equation, either (3.31) or (3.32), has to be deleted.
14That x(t) converges down to 0 is an implication of the necessary time continuity of
the price paths pe(t) and pf (t).
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5 Concluding remarks
Facing the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels and the pollution problems raised
by their exploitation, the economy should improve the efficiency of useful
energy production from any energy source, fossils or renewables. However,
efficiency gains being costly, the production cost of renewable energy should
increase throughout time, absent any technical progress able to reverse the
trend. This does not prevent renewables to take progressively a larger share
in the energy mix while expanding their land acreage despite the induced
rise of the land rent. Under the standard assumptions on costs and demands
retained in the present paper, the development of renewables is both an
intensive process, through continuous efficiency gains, and an extensive one,
through a larger occupation of space. Being in competition for land access
with renewables, the food production sector intensifies its activity on less
land but not sufficiently to counterbalance the acreage decrease. Hence the
food output decreases, inducing an increase of food prices.
The above dynamics of the energy and food sectors stops when the econ-
omy is actually constrained by the cap on the atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion. The cap implies a constant rate of exploitation of fossil fuels, absent any
abatement option. This is a general property of ceiling models not resulting
from our simplifying assumption of a constant self-regeneration rate of car-
bon in the atmosphere, but the non-availability of an outside option, like a
pollution abatement device, permitting to temporarily relax the ceiling con-
straint, as in Amigues and Moreaux, (2015-b). Any law of motion of carbon
concentration of the form Z˙ = G(ζx, Z) should admit under mild assump-
tions a unique root of the equation G(ζx, Z¯) = 0 when the economy must
satisfy the carbon cap. This constancy of the fossil fuel exploitation rate has
strong consequences over the variables dynamics. Facing a constant supply
of extracted fossils, the transformation industry makes no more any effort to
improve its conversion efficiency performance and delivers useful energy at a
constant rate. The energy price being now constant, the renewables sector
also stops making efficiency gains and no more increases its land occupation.
This stabilizes in turn the economic conditions in the food sector and the
land rent level.
From a policy viewpoint, a carbon pricing scheme implementing the first
best can be to charge the shadow cost of carbon in the useful energy price.
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The analysis shows that the carbon price should rise before the attainment of
the ceiling. However, during the ceiling period, the carbon price must decline
in order to keep constant the net surplus from fossil fuels exploitation, just
balancing the rise of the full marginal cost of extracted fossil fuels, the sum
of their extraction cost and mining rent. Such a carbon pricing device is
sufficient to restore optimality in a decentralized context and no subsidies to
renewable energy production or land acquisition for this activity are required.
In contrast with Chakravorty, Magné and Moreaux, (2008), (CMM there-
after), the land rent is always positive and either increases or stabilizes in two
situations, when oil is the only exploited energy source and/or the carbon cap
constraint binds. The CMM model combines a Ricardian description of land
use for renewables and food production with Hotelling dynamics for fossil
fuels exploitation. The land productivities in both activities are assumed to
be constant resulting in the possibility that some fraction of the land remains
fallow. With differentiated land productivities, a Ricardian order of the spa-
tial dynamics of land exploitation emerges, highest quality lands being used
in priority. With adjustable productivities and land free disposal, the spatial
Ricardian ordering is replaced by a pure time ordering. As in CMM, the land
sharing between food and renewables production should stay constant absent
the Hotelling logic of increasing fossil resources prices, e.g. in the ultimate
green economy. But contrarily to CMM, the whole available land should be
cultivated for food production if renewables are not yet competitive. This is
a consequence of the possibility for farmers to extensify their activity, reduce
their productivity and thus their production costs per acre.
When renewables are competitive, their land acreage expands in the CMM
framework because of the growing profitability of producing clean and renew-
able energy when the economy faces an increasing scarcity of fossil fuels and
carbon pollution problems. In the present model, the Hotelling logic plays
more indirectly on the renewables production dynamics. This is because
the rising price of useful energy makes attractive to use more costly, but
also more efficient, techniques that the renewables sector improves its energy
conversion performance per unit of land, this improvement allowing in turn
to undertake renewables production on larger areas despite increasing land
prices.
Our work may be extended in several directions. Instead of assuming
that the land allocation may be adjusted instantaneously without cost, the
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land conversion from agriculture to renewable energy production could be
subjected to specific conversion costs. Such costs are expected to rise with
the speed of land conversion. The result should be a smoothing of the energy
transition, the land conversion to renewables having to begin earlier. It may
even be the case that land conversion should begin before renewable energy
becomes competitive with respect to fossil fuels energy.
The literature has explored the optimal management of carbon sinks, like
forests, to alleviate climate change. In the present model context, this is
equivalent to assume that first, some fraction of the carbon emissions may
be indirectly abated and stored into forest lands, and second, that food and
renewable energy production will have to compete with forests for land access.
Alternatively, it may be assumed that the self-regeneration capacity of the
environment depends on the size of the forest areas. We leave this problem
for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Details of the matrixM of equation (3.37)
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Figure 1: Jump of u′f at time t¯. The case Lf (t¯−) > L˜f .
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(2) Shadow average pollution cost of useful oil energy: ⇣ Z/⌘x.
(1) Average production cost of food: f(')/'.
(2) Land rent per unit of food:  L/'.
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(3) Average cost of useful solar energy including the land rent:
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m +  L)/⌘y
(1) Average cost of useful oil energy including the mining rent:
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Figure 2: Optimal price paths:
Top: Useful energy price
Bottom: Food price.
35
ty tZ t¯Z t¯x t0
ty tZ t¯Z t¯x t0
ty tZ t¯Z t¯x t0
⌘x
⌘x(t¯
 
x )
⌘¯x
⌘¯y
⌘˜y
⌘y
'
'˜
'¯
'
Figure 3: Paths of efficiency and productivity rates:
Top: Efficiency rate in the oil transformation industry
Middle: Efficiency rate in the solar energy sector
Bottom: Productivity rate in the food sector.
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Figure 4: Paths of land allocation and land rent:
Top: Land allocation
Bottom: Land rent.
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